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King Makers?: Talk Radio, the Media Exemption, and Its 
Impact on the Washington Political Landscape 
Joshua M. Duffy† 
The First Amendment protects five freedoms―[those] of religion, 
speech, press, assembly and petition.  All are precious, but why is 
the political class so piously careful to exempt the press―the jour-
nalists who cover the political class―from restrictions the political 
class writes for others?  The question answers itself.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Political talk radio is a lucrative and influential business.  Rush 
Limbaugh, the most powerful voice in talk radio2 signed an eight-year 
contract extension in 2008 for a total value of about $400 million.3  Lim-
baugh’s weekly listeners number somewhere between 14 and 20 mil-
lion.4  Limbaugh was so influential in the Republican congressional elec-
tions of 1994, in which the Republicans took control of the House of 
Representatives for the first time in 54 years, that the congressional Re-
publicans made him an honorary member of the freshman class.5 
Limbaugh, and other radio talk show hosts like him throughout the 
country, exercise their influence in each political season.  For instance, in 
the 2008 presidential primaries, Limbaugh designed a radio campaign to 
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encourage Republicans to vote for Hillary Clinton in an effort to prolong 
the bitter primary contest between Clinton and Barack Obama.6  Al-
though the effect of Operation Chaos, as Limbaugh named this cam-
paign, was difficult to measure, Senator John Kerry accused Limbaugh 
of “tampering with the [Indiana] primary” and causing Obama’s defeat in 
the primary.7  Since President Obama’s election, Limbaugh has contin-
ued to speak both for and against a number of political issues.8  For ex-
ample, Limbaugh endorsed the President’s selection of Hillary Clinton as 
Secretary of State and called it “a brilliant stroke by Obama.”9 
Some have argued that because of its influence upon the electorate 
and upon particular campaigns, such radio commentary should fall with-
in applicable campaign finance regulations.10  They argue that if this type 
of commentary is not regulated as a form of campaign contribution or 
expenditure, media corporations could become king makers, providing 
their favored candidates and ballot measure advocates with unlimited 
access to the airwaves.11 
The ability to provide an unlimited and undocumented platform for 
selected issues or candidates would seem to be contrary to the policies 
behind campaign finance regulations.  Such regulations have admirable 
goals: reducing the cost of political campaigns; equalizing the ability of 
lesser-funded candidates to be heard; and reducing the possibilities for 
corruption and the appearance of corruption.12  In spite of these laudable 
policies, however, opponents of campaign finance regulations have 
warned that such laws are subject to abuse and may have the result of 
chilling or otherwise limiting socially useful and constitutionally pro-
tected political speech.13 
It is here, in the conflict between the competing policies of the First 
Amendment and campaign finance regulations, that the media exemption 
exists, protecting talk radio from the reach of those regulations.14  As the 
                                                 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  Ten percent of Democratic primary voters in Indiana admitted to exit pollsters that they 
were actually Republicans.  Id. 
 8. Katie Escherich, Limbaugh Calls Clinton Pick ‘Brilliant Stroke’ by Obama, ABC NEWS, 
Dec. 1, 2008, http://www.abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/Politics/story?id=6368280. 
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P.3d 831 (Wa. 2007) (No. 77966-0), 2006 WL 1893968. 
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name suggests, the media exemption, or press exemption, exempts press 
and media entities from campaign finance regulations on contributions 
and expenditures.15 
The conflict between the protection of the press and the goals of 
campaign finance regulations reached a crescendo in Washington State 
during the 2006 election cycle, culminating with the Washington State 
Supreme Court 2007 decision in San Juan Island v. No New Gas Tax.16  
The Supreme Court held that there is no limit on the extent to which talk 
radio hosts may advocate or speak against a particular candidate or issue 
and that their influence is not subject to any campaign finance restric-
tions.17  However, the Federal Elections Commission (FEC), the Wash-
ington State Public Disclosure Commission (PDC), and the United States 
Supreme Court have each taken positions regarding the application of the 
media exemption that are seemingly at odds with aspects of the court’s 
ruling. 
This Comment argues that despite the holding of the No New Gas 
Tax court, Washington’s version of the media exemption should be nar-
rowed in its application to talk show hosts, allowing it to more fully real-
ize the goals of campaign finance regulations.  Although it is difficult to 
draw a line that balances the competing interests of First Amendment 
protection and campaign finance regulations, it would be possible to nar-
row the media exemption so that First Amendment rights are protected, 
while also better achieving the goals of campaign finance reform.  This 
Comment does not suggest that the individual conduct of a radio talk 
show host should force the removal of the shield of the media exemption 
and mandate that the broadcasting station disclose such conduct as an in-
kind contribution or expenditure of a political campaign, subject to the 
same limits and restrictions as other contributions.  Rather, this Comment 
argues that talk show hosts who do not equally present both sides of 
campaign issues should file a report with the Washington State Public 
Disclosure Commission showing the duration and value of the air time 
provided.  This approach would protect the purpose of campaign finance 
disclosures by revealing the equivalent amount of money an opponent 
would have to spend to buy air time to promote their views or candidacy, 
while also protecting free speech interests.18 
                                                                                                             
New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831 (Wa. 2007) (No. 77966-0), 2005 WL 4049964 [hereinafter “Response 
Brief”]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831 (Wa. 2007). 
 17. Id. at 841. 
 18. This approach, it appears, was first suggested in a 1999 letter to the PDC.  Letter from 
Vicki L. Rippie, Assistant Director Public Information and Policy Development, Public Disclosure 
Commission, to Mr. and Mrs. Michael J. Brewer, July 1, 1999, available at 
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Part II discusses the legislative history of federal and Washington 
State campaign finance laws and the media exemption.  Part III examines 
the media exemption and its application by the Federal Elections Com-
mission.  Part IV examines Washington State’s application of the media 
exemption.  Part V examines the ramifications of the decision in No New 
Gas Tax on the media exemption and its application to the conduct of 
radio talk show hosts.  Finally, the argument is made that the media ex-
emption could be narrowed to more effectively achieve the policy objec-
tives of campaign finance regulations while preserving the First 
Amendment protections of the press. 
II.  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL AND WASHINGTON STATE 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW AND THE MEDIA EXEMPTION 
Section A of this part looks to the history of campaign finance leg-
islation to illustrate how the desire for disclosure of campaign contribu-
tions and expenditures and the desire to limit the influence of money 
shaped the current campaign regulatory system.  Section B examines the 
media exemption in federal and Washington State campaign finance reg-
ulations.  Finally, Section C examines the manner in which the media 
exemption spans the gap between the policy objectives of campaign 
finance regulations and the protections of the First Amendment. 
The purpose of this part is not to detail each phase of the evolutio-
nary process of Washington State and federal campaign finance law.  
Rather, the purpose is to provide a framework through which to better 
understand how campaign finance legislation has been an attempt to con-
trol the influence of money on the political process and why such regula-
tions are considered necessary.  As will be seen, these regulations are 
often seemingly at odds with constitutional protections of speech and the 
press.19  The regulation of funds to support a political campaign, accord-
ing to the United States Supreme Court, is the equivalent of regulating 
speech.20  It is this tension between the policies behind the regulation of 
campaign finance and the protection of speech and the press that is at the 
heart of the media exemption. 
                                                                                                             
http://www.pdc.wa.gov/archive/commissionmeetings/meetingshearings/pdfs/2007/09.27.07.SanJuan
CountyDocs.pdf, at 47.  In its response to the proposal, the author stated that the PDC did not have 
the legal authority to undertake such action because of the media exemption.  Id.  The response 
further stated that while not unsympathetic to the concerns raised, the situation was not one into 
which the PDC could interject any reporting responsibilities under current law.  Id. at 48. 
 19. The First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 20. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990). 
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A.  A Brief History of Federal Campaign Finance Legislation 
Although modern campaign finance legislation is often considered 
to have started with the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), 
campaign finance restrictions have existed in the United States since the 
nineteenth century.21  The first federal campaign finance legislation was 
a narrow 1867 law that prohibited federal officers from requesting con-
tributions from Navy Yard workers.22  Prior to 1971, Congress enacted 
multiple laws that sought broader regulation of federal campaign financ-
ing.23  The policies behind these laws included a desire to limit contribu-
tions to ensure that certain groups did not have a disproportionate influ-
ence on elections, a desire to prohibit certain sources of funds for cam-
paign purposes, a desire to control spending, and a desire to require pub-
lic disclosure of campaign finances to deter abuse and to educate the 
electorate.24 
The campaign finance provisions enacted before 1971, however, 
were largely ineffective at achieving their policy objectives.25  Not only 
did the provisions fail to provide an adequate administrative framework 
to ensure compliance, but the provisions also contained a number of spe-
cific flaws that allowed campaigns to avoid the intended regulatory ef-
fect.26  Congress, reacting to the evasion of the campaign finance and 
disclosure requirements that had accompanied earlier regulations, passed 
the more stringent disclosure provisions of the FECA in 1971.27 
The FECA of 1971 initiated fundamental changes in federal cam-
paign finance laws, requiring full disclosure of campaign contributions 
and expenditures and limiting spending on media advertisements.28  The 
Act, signed into law by President Nixon in 1972, was not without its own 
                                                 
 21. For a detailed history of campaign finance reform before 1971, see Melvin I. Urofsky, 
Campaign Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 22. The Federal Election Commission, Thirty Year Report (2005), at 3 n.3, http://www.fec.gov 
/info/publications/30year.pdf. 
 23. Urofsky, supra note 21, at 33.  Additionally, by 1959, forty-three states had some require-
ments for reporting campaign finance expenditures by candidates, their committees, or committees 
run by the parties, and thirty-one states had some limits on expenditures.  Id. 
 24. See id. at 1. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 34.  For example, under the 1925 Federal Corrupt Practices Act, a candidate could 
avoid the spending limit and disclosure requirements altogether because a candidate who claimed to 
have no knowledge of spending on his behalf was not liable under the act.  Id. at 20–21. 
 27. Id. at 33. 
 28. Id. at 49.  The law broadened the definitions of both “contributions” and “expenditures” in 
order to include almost any donation and cost associated with a political campaign.  Id.  The FECA 
set up specific rules for reporting contributions and expenditures, requiring that the names of all 
donors or lenders who gave $100 or more be reported and requiring that the names of all committee 
officials be listed.  Id.  Additionally, candidates now had limits on all media spending, both broad-
cast and print.  Id. at 50. 
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shortcomings, however, as it failed to provide for an independent body to 
monitor and enforce the law.29  Ironically, these shortcomings were 
brought into sharp focus by the Watergate scandal surrounding the 1972 
presidential election.30 
Although most of the crimes related to Watergate had little or noth-
ing to do with campaign financing, public outrage grew as the facts of 
how Nixon had raised and used money became known.31  The disclo-
sures of Watergate fed the demand for more effective campaign finance 
reform.32  The failure of the FECA of 1971 to provide for effective over-
sight of campaign finance laws was corrected in 1974 with establishment 
of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) as part of the 1974 Amend-
ments to the FECA.33  The FEC was given jurisdiction in civil enforce-
ment matters, authority to write regulations, and responsibility for moni-
toring compliance with the FECA.34 
In addition to creating the FEC, the 1974 Amendments established 
strict disclosure requirements for campaign contributions and set specific 
limits for those donations.35  Also, the amended FECA prohibits corpora-
tions from making contributions or expenditures from their general trea-
sury funds “in connection with” the election of any candidate for federal 
office.36  Under the amendments, a contribution or expenditure includes 
“direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of 
money, or any services, or anything of value.”37  The Act defines “con-
tribution” and “expenditure” to include “anything of value” made for the 
purpose of influencing any election for federal office. 38  The term “any-
thing of value” includes in-kind contributions.39  Based on the plain 
meaning of this portion of the Act, it could be argued that a talk radio 
                                                 
 29. The Federal Election Commission, Thirty Year Report (2005), at 4, 
http://www.fec.gov/info/publications/30year.pdf. 
 30. Watergate was far more than a botched burglary; it was a worst-case scenario of a badly 
flawed campaign finance system that failed to forestall corruption or prevent out-and-out criminal 
activity.  President Nixon’s reelection committee funneled illegal corporate contributions into slush 
funds, paid for break-ins, and traded cash for favors.  Id. at 50–55. 
 31. Id. at 55. 
 32. Id. at 53. 
 33. Id. at 56.  Although known as amendments, the 1974 measure addressed not only the per-
ceived shortcomings of the 1971 FECA, but it also addressed almost every major provision within 
the 1971 FECA.  Id.  See also, Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–55 (2000)). 
 34. Urofsky, supra note 21, at 56. 
 35. Id. at 60–61.  In addition, the 1974 Amendments to the FECA also instituted the system of 
public financing of presidential elections that is used today.  Id.  See also 2 U.S.C. §§ 432, 434 
(2000). 
 36. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2008). 
 37. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2000). 
 38. Id. § 431(8)–(9). 
 39. 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1) (2005). 
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host’s endorsement of a candidate or solicitation of support for a ballot 
initiative would be a contribution to the respective campaign because that 
support would be of value to the candidate. 
Key portions of the 1974 amendments were struck down by the Su-
preme Court in 1976 in its controversial landmark decision, Buckley v. 
Valeo.40  In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld individual contribution 
limits to a federal candidate in each election,41 but it struck down the 
FECA’s limits on expenditures by candidates as violating the First 
Amendment.42  The Buckley Court held that campaign finance regula-
tions may burden the exercise of political speech but must be narrowly 
tailored to serve compelling government interests and must “satisfy the 
exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment 
rights of political expression.”43  Untouched by Buckley, however, was 
the media exemption. 
Despite the fact that Buckley did not specifically address the media 
exemption, the Court’s reasoning seems to provide an avenue to a possi-
ble narrowing of the media exemption.  Because Buckley held that cam-
paign finance regulations may burden the exercise of political speech, the 
media exemption could be narrowed to better serve the legitimate gov-
ernment interests of campaign finance regulations.  This narrowing of the 
media exemption would be possible so long as it is able to satisfy the 
exacting scrutiny that would be given to limitations on rights of political 
expression. 
B.  The Current Washington State and Federal Media Exemption 
The federal media exemption, as well as its Washington State in-
carnation, was intended to preserve the First Amendment protections of 
the press from the regulatory effect of campaign finance laws.44  As 
campaign finance regulations have been amended and augmented in an 
effort to more fully achieve their policy objectives, those regulations 
have continued to exempt the media.45  To understand more fully how 
                                                 
 40. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 41. Id. at 23–25.  See also id. at 35–36, 38. 
 42. See id. at 39–51.  For a detailed examination of the distinction between contributions and 
expenditures recognized in Buckley, see Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An 
Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 26 (1996). 
 43. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–45.  See also Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
652, 659 (1990) (recognizing that “the compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption 
supports the restriction of the influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate 
form”). 
 44. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1239, at 4 (1974); San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 
831, 839 (Wa. 2007). 
 45. The federal media exemption excludes from the definition of “expenditure”: “any news 
story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, news-
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the media exemption impacts talk radio, as well as to understand what 
changes would be necessary to effectively realize the policy objectives of 
campaign finance regulations, it is necessary to examine the federal and 
Washington State interpretations of the exemption. 
The legislative history of the media exemption makes it clear that 
Congress, in adopting the media exemption, recognized the tension be-
tween the First Amendment and campaign finance limits.46  Congress 
expressed that its intent was to preserve the media’s traditional function 
of public commentary and not to present legislation to limit or burden the 
First Amendment freedoms of the press and of association.47  The ex-
emption would assure the unfettered rights of the newspapers, TV net-
works, and other media to cover and comment on political campaigns.48  
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that exempting the 
media from campaign finance regulations legitimately protects the 
press’s unique role in “informing and educating the public, offering criti-
cism, and providing a forum for discussion and debate.”49 
In an attempt to correct perceived flaws in the campaign finance 
system, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA).50  The BCRA substantially amended campaign finance regula-
tions by creating new regulations on “electioneering communication.”51  
The BCRA adopts a broad definition of electioneering communication in 
an effort to regulate more of certain types of speech than under the tradi-
tional FECA framework.52  The BCRA also exempts media entities from 
its electioneering communication definition.53  While there was little de-
bate about extending the media exemption to the newly formed provi-
sions on electioneering communication,54 some argue that this extension 
signified Congress’s commitment to the media exemption.55 
                                                                                                             
paper, magazine, or other periodical publications, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by 
any political party, political committee, or candidate.”  2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (2000). 
 46. H.R. REP. No. 93-1239, at 4 (1974). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667 (1990) (holding that a state may 
exempt media entities from otherwise generally applicable campaign finance regulations). 
 50. Christopher P. Zubowicz, The New Press Corps: Applying the Federal Election Campaign 
Act’s Press Exemption to Online Political Speech, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, 8 (2004). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 94 (“It was simply understood [by Congress] that the media should continue to 
get special protection in order to ensure that they are unfettered in the exercise of their First 
Amendment rights.”). 
 55. Joshua L. Shapiro, Comment, Corporate Media Power, Corruption, and the Media Exemp-
tion, 55 EMORY L.J. 161, 173–174 (2006). 
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Washington State campaign finance regulations have largely mir-
rored federal legislative intent and policy.  In 1972, Washington voters 
passed Initiative 276, later enacted as Washington Revised Code § 42.17, 
which regulates the financing of political campaigns.56  In adopting Initi-
ative 276, Washington voters consciously chose to implement campaign 
contribution disclosure requirements similar to those of the 1971 
FECA.57  The purpose of the measure was to promote “public confidence 
in government at all levels” through a system of compelled disclosure of 
campaign contributions and expenditures.58  Additionally, the public’s 
right to know the financing of political campaigns and the financial af-
fairs of elected officials and candidates was deemed to far outweigh “any 
right that these matters remain secret and private.”59 
In 1992, Washington voters approved Initiative 134, the Fair Cam-
paign Practices Act (FCPA), which amended Washington Revised Code 
§ 42.17.60  The FCPA supplemented the previously existing disclosure 
requirements with certain limitations on campaign contributions and ex-
penditures.61  The FCPA defines “contribution,” in relevant part, as 
[a] loan, gift, deposit, subscription, forgiveness of indebtedness, do-
nation, advance, pledge, payment, transfer of funds between politi-
cal committees, or anything of value, including personal and profes-
sional services for less than full consideration;62 
The financing by a person of the dissemination, distribution, or re-
publication, in whole or in part, of broadcast, written, graphic, or 
other form of political advertising or electioneering communication 
                                                 
 56. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831, 834 (Wa. 2007).  See also 1973 Wash. 
Sess. Laws. ch. 1 § 1. 
 57. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.010(8) (2008).  In adopting Initiative 276, Washington voters 
declared that the “concepts of disclosure and limitation of election campaign financing are estab-
lished by the passage of the [FECA] of 1971 by the Congress of the United States, and in conse-
quence thereof, it is desirable to have implementing legislation at the state level.”  Id. 
 58. Id. § 42.17.010(1),(5) (2008). 
 59. Id. § 42.17.010(10) (2008).  See also Fritz v. Gorton, 517 P.2d 911 (1974).  In Fritz, the 
Washington Supreme Court affirmed the FECA against free speech and other constitutional chal-
lenges.  The court noted: “The electorate . . . has the right to know of the sources and magnitude of 
financial and persuasional influences upon government.”  Id. at 931.  In rejecting the challenge, the 
court said: “We accept as self-evident . . . that the right to receive information is the fundamental 
counterpart of the right of free speech. . . . [The Act] seeks to enlarge the information base upon 
which the electorate makes its decisions.”  Id. at 924–25. 
 60. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 834.  See also 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws. ch. 2 §§ 1–36. 
 61. Among other changes mandated by Initiative 134, the FCPA made it illegal to either give 
or receive a contribution of more than $5,000 to any campaign within twenty-one days of an elec-
tion.  WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.105(8) (2008). 
 62. Id. § 42.17.020 (15)(a)(i) (2008). 
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prepared by a candidate, a political committee, or its authorized 
agent.63 
At the same time, however, the definition of “contribution” was amended 
to expressly exempt certain press activities: 
“Contribution” does not include: . . .  A news item, feature, com-
mentary or editorial in a regularly scheduled news medium that is of 
primary interest to the general public, that is in a news medium con-
trolled by a person whose business is that news medium, and that is 
not controlled by a candidate or political committee.64 
Following the passage of the BCRA and the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision upholding the new federal regulations of “electioneering 
communication,”65 the Washington legislature adopted similar regula-
tions of “electioneering communications” and likewise incorporated the 
media exemption for 
[a] news item, feature, commentary, or editorial in a regularly sche-
duled news medium that is: (i) Of primary interest to the general 
public; (ii) In a news medium controlled by a person whose busi-
ness is that news medium; and (iii) Not a medium controlled by a 
candidate or a political committee.66 
Although the federal and Washington State media exemptions have tex-
tual differences, Washington’s statute expressly incorporated the federal 
courts’ construction of the media exemption.67  The Washington State 
Supreme Court found that by adopting the federal courts’ construction, 
the voters intended the state media exemption to be functionally equiva-
lent to, and to be interpreted in accordance with, the federal media ex-
emption.68 
C.  Protection of the Press and the Interpretation of the Media 
Exemption 
The media exemption spans the gap between speech protected by 
the First Amendment and the regulation of campaign contributions and 
expenditures.  Because the media’s role in society is unique, courts have 
been steadfast in their protection of the press.  Such steadfast protection, 
                                                 
 63. Id. § 42.17.020(15)(a)(iii) (2008). 
 64. Id. § 42.17.020(15)(b)(iv) (2008). 
 65. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 66. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.020(21)(c) (2008).  See also supra note 38. 
 67. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831, 838 (Wa. 2007). 
 68. Id.  The state media exemption differs from the federal media exemption in that the lan-
guage “distributed through the facilities of” any media source is replaced with “in a regularly sche-
duled news medium that is of primary interest to the general public.”  Id..  See also 2 U.S.C. § 
431(9)(B)(i) (2000). 
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however, does not mean that the media exemption is the necessary means 
of maintaining such protection.  While recognizing the necessary func-
tion of the press, the courts have repeatedly indicated that certain limits 
would be permissible. 
The Supreme Court has championed the role of the press as funda-
mental to the protection of free society.  In New York Times v. Sullivan,69 
for example, the Court stated that there is “a profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, 
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public of-
ficials.”70  Two years later, in Mills v. Alabama,71 the Court held that 
“[s]uppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize government 
agents and to clamor and contend for or against change, . . . muzzles one 
of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and 
deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free.”72  Any ef-
forts that might limit the media function, whether by means of campaign 
finance regulations or some other mechanism, must therefore be pre-
vented from impinging on the constitutional standing of the press.73 
The constitutionality of the media exemption is premised upon the 
special role of press endorsements during elections.74  In Austin v. Michi-
gan Chamber of Commerce,75 for example, the Court examined a Michi-
gan campaign finance law that barred corporations from engaging in 
campaign expenditures from corporate treasury funds in support of or in 
opposition to candidates for state office.76  The plaintiffs argued that the 
law’s ban on corporate campaign expenditures was a violation of the 
                                                 
 69. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 70. Id. at 270. 
 71. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, (1966).  In Mills, Birmingham held an election regarding 
which form of city government the voters preferred.  Id. at 215.  The editor of a local paper was 
arrested after he ran an editorial on election day supporting a mayor-council form of government.  
Id. at 215−16. 
 72. Id. at 219. 
 73. It is worth noting, however, that the framers did not design, nor has the United States Su-
preme Court recognized, a protection for the press that extends beyond the protection of other 
speech.  In his concurring opinion in First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 756 (1978), for exam-
ple, Chief Justice Burger stated that “the history of the [Press] Clause does not suggest that the au-
thors contemplated a ‘special’ or ‘institutional’ privilege.”  Id. at 798.  See also Richard L. Hasen, 
Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1657–58 (1999) 
(noting that “there is scant evidence that the framers’ original intent in writing the Constitution was 
to give the media greater constitutional protection through the Press Clause than society was to re-
ceive through the Speech Clause of the First Amendment”). 
 74. Hasen, supra note 73, at 1658. 
 75. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 76. Id. at 654. 
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Equal Protection Clause because the law contained a media exemption 
very similar to the FECA’s media exemption.77 
The Court noted, however, that it had consistently recognized the 
unique role of the press.  The Court held that “[a]lthough all corporations 
enjoy the same state-conferred benefits inherent in the corporate form, 
media corporations differ significantly from other corporations in that 
their resources are devoted to the collection of information and its disse-
mination to the public.”78  Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall 
noted that without the media exemption, the Act’s definition of “ex-
penditure” could conceivably be interpreted to encompass election re-
lated news stories and editorials.79  Therefore, the Court found that al-
though the Act’s restriction on independent expenditures might otherwise 
discourage news broadcasters or publishers from serving their crucial 
societal role, the media exemption ensures that the Act does not hinder or 
prevent the institutional press from reporting on, and publishing edito-
rials about, newsworthy events.80  Justice Marshall continued:  “Al-
though the press’ unique societal role may not entitle the press to greater 
protection under the Constitution, it does provide a compelling reason for 
the State to exempt media corporations from the scope of political ex-
penditure limitations.”81 
While Marshall’s discussion of the unique role of the press suggests 
that the media’s exemption from campaign finance restrictions might be 
a constitutional requirement,82 the Court noted that regulations that im-
pinge on the right to engage in political expression may be permissible if 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.83  Addi-
tionally, Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Austin, suggested that it would 
be constitutional to end the media exemption entirely.  Justice Scalia 
                                                 
 77. Id. at 666.  The Michigan law regulating corporate expenditures excluded from the defini-
tion of an expenditure any “expenditure by a broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other 
periodical or publication of any news story, commentary, or editorial in support of or opposition to a 
candidate for elective office . . . in the regular course of publication or broadcasting.”  Mich. Comp. 
Laws Ann.  169.206(3)(d) (West 1989).  The court, after quoting this provision, noted that the FECA 
“contains a similar exemption.”  Austin, 494 U.S. at 667 n.5. 
 78. Austin, 494 U.S. at 667. 
 79. Id. at 668. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  It should be noted that the narrowing of the media exemption suggested by this Com-
ment would continue to exempt media entities from the scope of any political contribution or ex-
penditure limitations. 
 82. See Hasen, supra note 73, at 1651−52. 
 83. Austin, 494 U.S. at 666.  The Court specifically held that Michigan’s decision to regulate 
only corporations is precisely tailored to serve the compelling state interest of eliminating from the 
political process the corrosive effect of political “war chests” amassed with the aid of the legal ad-
vantages given to corporations.  Id. 
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noted that the Court did not hold that the media exception was constitu-
tionally required, only permissible.84 
In his dissent, Justice Scalia noted the media exemption’s inherent 
contradictions to the purposes of campaign finance regulations. 85  He 
noted that while the majority found Michigan’s campaign regulations 
constitutional because of the compelling state need to prevent amassed 
corporate wealth from skewing the political debate, the unique role of the 
press would seem to provide an especially strong reason to include it in 
Michigan’s corporate restrictions.86 
Amassed corporate wealth that regularly sits astride the ordinary 
channels of information is much more likely to produce [too much 
of one point of view] than amassed corporate wealth that is general-
ly busy making money elsewhere.  Such media corporations not on-
ly have vastly greater power to perpetrate the evil of overinforming, 
they also have vastly greater opportunity.87 
While Justice Scalia wrote for the dissenting justices, his comments 
ought to give pause as the application of the media exemption to talk ra-
dio hosts is considered.  As Justice Scalia noted, one of the purposes of 
campaign finance regulations is to prevent the amassed wealth of corpo-
rations from skewing political debate.88  One must also assume that the 
amassed power of the media, and of talk radio in particular, is also able 
to skew political debate. 
Although Austin reached the Court long before McConnell v. Fed-
eral Election Commission,89 the justices’ rationale in Austin seemed to 
remain intact even after the BCRA.90  While the BCRA adopted a broad 
definition of electioneering communication to regulate even more speech 
than under the traditional FECA framework, the Court in McConnell 
                                                 
 84. Id. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court today holds merely that media corporations 
may be excluded from Michigan law, not that they must be.”).  Justice Scalia stated that “[T]he 
Court’s holding on [the media exemption] must be put in the following unencouraging form: ‘Al-
though the press’ unique societal role may not entitle the press to greater protection under the Con-
stitution, . . . it does provide a compelling reason for the State to exempt media corporations from the 
scope of political expenditure limitations.’  One must hope, I suppose, that Michigan will continue to 
provide this generous and voluntary exemption.”  Id. at 691−92. 
 85. Id. at 691. 
 86. Id. at 690−91. 
 87. Id. at 691. 
 88. Id. at 690−91. 
 89. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 90. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, PUB. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, 88-90 (codi-
fied at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (Supp. III 2003)).  See also Zubowicz, supra note 50, at 8 (noting that the 
broad aims of the BCRA were to reduce the perceived influence of non-federal funds on federal 
elections, to regulate certain electioneering communications, and to alter the government’s approach 
to certain coordinated expenditures). 
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continued to exempt the media from such restrictions.91  Justices Stevens 
and O’Connor, writing for the majority, dismissed a challenge that the 
BCRA was fatally under-inclusive because the electioneering communi-
cation provisions discriminated in favor of media corporations and gave 
“free reign to media companies to engage in speech without resort to 
PAC money.”92  They explained that Congress had the authority to act 
incrementally in regulating this area.93  The majority cited Austin for the 
proposition that a valid distinction exists between corporations that are 
part of the media industry and other corporations that are not involved in 
the regular business of imparting news to the public.94  The Court, while 
affirming Congress’s ability to protect the political speech expressed in 
media commentary, did not state, however, that such a distinction was 
constitutionally required.95  Instead, the Court echoed Austin, indicating 
that it did not consider the media exemption a constitutional requirement, 
that such an exemption was permissible,96 and that Congress had the au-
thority to proceed in incremental steps in the area of campaign finance 
regulation.97 
As was the case with Buckley, the Court in McConnell seems to 
have left the door open to a possible narrowing of the media exemption 
by Congress.  Because the exemption is permissible, but not constitu-
tionally required, Congress could narrow the exemption to better achieve 
the goals of campaign finance regulations without chilling political 
speech.  The Washington State Supreme Court, as will be discussed in 
Part V, chose to take the further step of directly stating that a narrower 
exception would be within the power of the legislature.98 
IV. THE MEDIA EXEMPTION AND ITS APPLICATION BY THE FEC 
Given the protection of speech and of the press within the First 
Amendment, and given the competing policy objectives of campaign 
finance regulations, it is necessary to understand when the media exemp-
tion is applicable to what would otherwise be a campaign contribution.  
If a media outlet is acting within the requirements of the exemption, con-
duct that would otherwise be a violation of campaign finance regulations 
is protected.  By looking at the manner in which the FEC determines the 
applicability of the media exemption, it is possible to understand why 
                                                 
 91. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 208. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See McConnell, 540 U.S. 93. 
 96. Id. at 108. 
 97. Id. at 158. 
 98. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831, 840 n.10 (Wa. 2007). 
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talk radio commentary can present particular challenges to the applica-
tion of the exemption.  Also, an examination of the aspects of particular 
instances in which the FEC applied the exemption helps in understanding 
how a narrowing of the media exemption would better serve the policy 
objectives of campaign finance regulations. 
To determine whether the media exemption applies in individual 
cases, the FEC must evaluate whether the entity engaging in the activity 
is a media entity within the meaning of the FECA and the FEC’s regula-
tions.99  As previously noted, the FECA’s media exemption applies to 
“any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodical pub-
lication.”100 
After the FEC concludes that there is a qualifying press entity for 
the purposes of the exemption, the Commission must determine whether 
the activity at issue was a legitimate press function.101  To answer this 
question, the FEC considers two criteria: (1) whether the press entity is 
owned or controlled by a political party, political committee, or candi-
date; and (2) whether the press entity is operating within its legitimate 
press function.102  If the media entity is independent of any political par-
ty, committee, or candidate, and if it was acting as a legitimate media 
entity at the time of the alleged violation, it is exempt from the FECA’s 
restrictions on corporate contributions and expenditures, and the FEC’s 
inquiry should end.103  In applying this analysis, the FEC considers 
whether the entity’s materials are available to the general public and are 
comparable in form to those ordinarily issued by the entity.”104 
                                                 
 99. See, e.g., FEC, Advisory Op. 2005-16, 5 (2005), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/ 
saos/searchao.  From this link, enter the Advisory Opinion number in the “Go to AO number” box.  
See also FEC, Advisory Op. 2004-07 (2004), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao. 
 100. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (2000).  For a comprehensive look at the FEC process for deter-
mining a press entity, see Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens For Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 
(1986). 
 101. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Phillips Publ’g, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1308, 1312−13 (D.D.C. 
1981). 
 102. See, e.g., FEC, Advisory Op. 2005-16, 5 (2005), available at 
http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Id.  This test was first promulgated in Reader’s Digest Ass’n v. FEC, 509 F. Supp. 1210 
(1981).  The district court noted that “[n]o explicit reference is to be found in the statue to this two-
step process.  It seems to me, however, to be the necessary accommodation between, on the one 
hand, the Commission’s duty to investigate possible violations and, on the other, the statutory ex-
emption for the press combined with a First Amendment distaste for government investigations of 
press functions.”  Id. at 1215.  See also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Phillips Publ’g, Inc., 517 F. Supp 
1308 (D.D.C. 1981).  The court in Phillips outlined a similar two-part test to determine whether the 
media exemption is available with respect to a particular communication.  The court explained: 
[T]he initial inquiry is limited to whether the press entity is owned or controlled by a po-
litical party or candidate and whether the press entity was acting as a press entity with re-
spect to the conduct in question.  If the press entity is not owned or controlled by a politi-
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A.  Political Control and Legitimate Press Function 
To be exempt from contribution or expenditure requirements under 
the media exemption, an organization must be engaged in legitimate me-
dia activity.105  This does not mean, however, that for the exemption to 
apply, the press entity must function exactly as it usually does,106 nor 
does legitimate media activity depend on an objective presentation.107  
One commentator has noted that if an organization can convince the 
commission that it is a genuine press entity that is not under political 
control, then the commission will not subject its conduct to rigorous 
scrutiny as to the nature of the press function and likely will conclude 
that the entity’s activity is covered by the exemption.108  The FEC will 
determine that the exemption does not apply only if it is clear that the 
conduct of the press entity was inappropriate.109 
B.  In re Dave Ross 
In an analysis of the FEC’s application of the media exemption to 
talk radio hosts involved in political campaigns, the tension between the 
policy objectives of campaign finance regulations and the protections of 
the First Amendment is plainly apparent.  It is clear that talk radio hosts 
could engage in conduct that would otherwise be subject to campaign 
finance regulations but for the media exemption.  It is equally apparent, 
however, that certain conduct should continue to be protected by the me-
dia exemption because it does not conflict with the goals of campaign 
finance legislation.  In these cases, the application of the media exemp-
tion successfully balances the competing interest of campaign finance 
regulations with the First Amendment protections. 
The FEC has received many complaints and has issued a number of 
advisory opinions that set out the breadth of the federal media exemption 
                                                                                                             
cal party or candidate and is acting as a press entity, the FEC lacks subject matter juris-
diction and is barred from investigating the subject matter of the complaint. 
Id. at 1313. 
 105. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 208 (2003). 
 106. Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 4 (FEC Mar. 17, 2006) (statement of reasons), available at 
http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050CC.pdf.  See also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for 
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 251 (1986) (holding that the press exemption did not apply to a special 
edition of a newsletter because it was not comparable to any single issue of newsletter). 
 107. FEC, Advisory Op. 2005-19, 5 (2005), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao.  
Therefore, a media entity otherwise eligible for the media exemption would not lose its eligibility 
merely because of a lack of objectivity in a news story, commentary, or editorial, even if the content 
expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office. 
 108. Zubowicz, supra note 50, at 19. 
 109. Id. 
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as applied to broadcast media.110  The Commission has also specifically 
addressed the issue of whether the on-air conduct of talk radio hosts, and 
talk radio station ownership, falls within the media exemption, or wheth-
er such conduct should be considered an in-kind contribution or expendi-
ture.111  An understanding of the rationale used by the FEC aids not only 
in the understanding of the application of the media exemption in Wash-
ington State, but also aids in an understanding of how and why the media 
exemption might be narrowed for certain on-air commentary. 
In a recent Washington State case, the FEC issued an opinion about 
the on-air conduct of a radio talk show host who was also a congression-
al candidate.112  Dave Ross, host of a talk show on radio station KIRO-
AM in Seattle, Washington, was a candidate for Washington’s Eighth 
Congressional District in 2004.113  The Washington State Republican 
Party filed a complaint with the FEC, alleging that KIRO-AM knowingly 
and willfully made, and Ross and his campaign committee knowingly 
and willfully accepted, illegal in-kind contributions.114  The FEC con-
cluded that the media exemption applied, and it found no reason to be-
lieve that the FECA had been violated.115 
In that case, Ross had hosted “The Dave Ross Show” on KIRO-AM 
since 1987.116  The show aired in Washington’s Eighth Congressional 
District five days a week for three hours a day.117  On it, Ross discussed 
news, current events, politics, entertainment, technology, and other sub-
                                                 
 110. See, e.g., FEC, Advisory Op. 2000-13 (2000), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/ 
saos/searchao?SUBMIT=ao&AO=656 (considering whether the media exemption applied to gavel-
to-gavel coverage of the Republican and Democratic national conventions; concluding that “gavel-to 
gavel-coverage of national party conventions that includes interviews and commentary by journal-
ists, by an entity that covers governmental and political affairs, readily fits into the categories of 
news story and commentary set out in the Act”).  See also, FEC, Advisory Op. 2005-19 (2005), 
available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao.  The FEC considered three scenarios: (1) a pro-
gram host mentions a candidate on the air, (2) a candidate is interviewed on a program, and (3) a 
person calling into a program mentions a candidate.  The FEC concluded that all of these activities 
“would be legitimate press functions; [and] would come within the press exemption[.]”  Id. 
 111. See, e.g., Dave Ross, MUR 5555, (FEC, Jan. 10, 2006) (First General Counsel’s Report), 
available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C7.pdf. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 2. 
 114. Id. at 1. 
 115. Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 1 (FEC Mar. 17, 2006) (statement of reasons), available at 
http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050CC.pdf. 
 116. The Dave Ross Show, http://www.mynorthwest.com/?sid=21762&nid=130 (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2009).  Dave Ross has also had a daily commentary on CBS Radio Network since 1983, 
which is heard nationally.  He also substitutes regularly for Charles Osgood on “The Osgood File” 
on CBS News Radio, which is carried on approximately 240 stations nationwide, including KIRO-
AM.  Id. 
 117. Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 4 (FEC, Nov. 19, 2004) (Joint Response of Friends of Dave Ross 
et al. to the Complaint by Chris Vance), available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C2.pdf. 
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jects.118  The complaint alleged that on May 5, 2004, during his show, 
Ross first publicly contemplated a run for Congress by stating: “I can just 
assume that [State Democratic Party Chairman Paul Berendt] thinks my 
name recognition would be a good thing.”119  Additionally, between May 
5th and May 20th, 2004, a guest host on the Dave Ross Show asked lis-
teners whether Ross should run for Congress.  An online survey on the 
same topic ran on the station’s website; the website also reportedly “he-
ralded Ross’s candidacy with headlines stating ‘Dave for Congress’ and 
a prominent link to his campaign website.”120  Although Ross announced 
his decision to run for Congress on May 20, 2004, he remained on the air 
and continued to host The Dave Ross Show until July 23, 2004.121  From 
the time Ross stopped hosting his show, through the general election in 
November 2004, KIRO-AM continued referring to Ross’ daily time slot 
as “The Dave Ross Show,” using a guest host to run it.122  On September 
14, 2004, Dave Ross won the primary election.  The next day, the Dave 
Ross Show featured Dave Ross as a special guest to discuss his primary 
victory.123 
In its evaluation of the facts alleged in the complaint and answer, 
the FEC looked specifically at the alleged corporate contributions and the 
media exemption.124  The FEC concluded that the broadcasting station 
“is the type of media entity covered by the media exemption and is not 
owned or controlled by a political party, committee or candidate.”125  The 
FEC concluded that the sole question, then, was whether the station was 
acting within its legitimate press function.126 
The FEC found that KIRO-AM was acting within its legitimate 
press function.127  The Commission found that the format, distribution, 
                                                 
 118. Id. 
 119. Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 2 (FEC, Oct. 5, 2004) (Complaint Against Mr. Dave Ross et al.), 
available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050BF.pdf. 
 120. Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 3, (FEC, Jan. 10, 2006) (First General Counsel’s Report), availa-
ble at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C7.pdf. 
 121. Id.  The FEC, in its First General Counsel’s Report, did note, however, that Ross an-
nounced his candidacy during an event called “Battle of the Talk Show Hosts,” broadcast on KIRO-
AM in the evening of May 20, 2004.  The station’s response to the FEC stated that Ross’s an-
nouncement was in response to a direct question asked of him by the emcee of the evening concern-
ing rumors she had heard.  Neither KIRO nor [its corporate owner] had prior knowledge that such an 
event would occur.  Id. at 3 n.2.  Ross officially became a candidate for federal office on June 2, 
2004, when he received contributions aggregating in excess of $5,000.  Id. at 3 n.3. 
 122. Id. at 3.  Also, during August 2004, Ross gave nineteen commentary pieces for CBS News 
radio, which may have aired in Washington’s Eighth Congressional district on CBS affiliate KIRO-
AM.  Id. at 3–4. 
 123. Id. at 4. 
 124. Id. at 5. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 7. 
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and production of the show were not altered during the period in ques-
tion.128  “In addition to avoiding discussion of his candidacy, Mr. Ross 
specifically avoided any solicitation of or response to any questions by 
listeners regarding his candidacy during the call-in portions of the 
show.”129  Additionally, the FEC noted that other on-air personalities 
were also given strict directives by the station, prohibiting them from 
referring to Ross’s campaign on the air.130  Regarding the broadcasts of 
the Dave Ross Show with guest hosts, the Commission found no indica-
tion that those shows were anything other than regularly scheduled pro-
grams of news, editorials, or commentary.131 
The FEC also found that KIRO’s broadcasts of the Dave Ross 
Show within the electioneer communications period132 qualified for the 
media exemption for electioneering communications under the same ra-
tionale by which they qualified for the media exemption from the defini-
tion of “expenditure.”133 
                                                 
 128. Id.  Although the Commission stated that the issue in Ross did not turn on the question of 
whether anything about Ross’s talk show changed after Ross became a candidate and stayed on the 
air, the FEC found little indication that anything about the Dave Ross Show changed after Ross 
became a candidate and stayed on the air.  See Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 5 (FEC Mar. 17, 2006) 
(statement of reasons), available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050CC.pdf, and Dave Ross, 
MUR 5555, 6, (FEC, Jan. 10, 2006) (First General Counsel’s Report), available at 
http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C7.pdf. 
 129. Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 7, (FEC, Jan. 10, 2006) (First General Counsel’s Report), availa-
ble at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C7.pdf. 
 130. Id.  As to the two instances that Ross did in fact reference his candidacy or potential can-
didacy (one statement that he was considering running, and a second acknowledging that he was 
running), the FEC concluded that “these incidents do not appear to take either [of those two specific 
shows] outside the station’s legitimate press function.”  Id.  With regard to the poll taken on the 
KIRO website asking whether Ross should become a candidate, the Commission also found that to 
fall within the media exemption.  Id. at 8.  Because the show regularly featured discussions about 
news, politics, and current events, “it falls within the range of what qualifies as ‘legitimate press 
activity’ for such a show to post on its web site surveys regarding issues in politics, current events, 
and popular culture.”  Id.  The FEC concluded that because there was no apparent attempt to use the 
results in an actual determination of Ross’ possible candidacy, the poll should not be treated as a 
“testing the waters” contribution or expenditure.  Id. at 8–9.  See also 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.131(a), 101.3 
(2003).  It is worth noting that the FEC found that the same media exemption analysis it applied with 
regard to Ross’s appearance on KIRO-AM also applied to his appearance on CBS News Radio.  
Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 10, (FEC, Jan. 10, 2006) (First General Counsel’s Report), available at 
http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C7.pdf. 
 131. Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 8, (FEC, Jan. 10, 2006) (First General Counsel’s Report), availa-
ble at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C7.pdf. 
 132. An electioneering communication occurs where a broadcast, cable, or satellite communi-
cation targeted to the relevant electorate clearly identifies a federal candidate within thirty days of a 
primary election or sixty days of a general election.  11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a) (2005).  The FEC noted 
that Ross stopped hosting the Dave Ross show more than thirty days before the primary election and 
more than sixty days before the general election.  Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 11, (FEC, Jan. 10, 2006) 
(First General Counsel’s Report), available at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C7.pdf. 
 133. Dave Ross, MUR 5555, 11, (FEC, Jan. 10, 2006) (First General Counsel’s Report), avail-
able at http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocs/000050C7.pdf. 
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The FEC’s conclusion regarding the Dave Ross Show was not 
unique, as the FEC reached similar conclusions in other opinions.  In 
1992, for example, the FEC was asked for an advisory opinion concern-
ing the application of the FECA of 1971, as amended, and FEC regula-
tions about “the airing of your radio show while you are a candidate for 
Federal office.”134  In that case, the candidate, Randall Terry, had been 
the host of a daily radio talk show, the “Randall Terry Show,” that dealt 
with “all major contemporary issues . . . in which the news of the day is 
discussed.”135 
While the candidate asked the FEC whether he might continue to 
host his radio show while running for office, the FEC specifically ad-
dressed the issues of whether the expenses incurred by Randall Terry 
Live, Inc., or by the radio stations or network carrying the show, would 
be in-kind corporate contributions to the campaign.136  The Commission 
concluded that the candidate could continue hosting his talk show, with-
out receiving an in-kind contribution, based on the candidate’s represen-
tations that he did not intend to use the show to promote or raise funds 
for his candidacy and that no ads raising funds for or promoting his can-
didacy would be run during the show.137 
Although the FEC found the radio stations to be acting within their 
legitimate press function in Ross and Terry, it is significant that the FEC 
issued its opinions based on the fact that neither Ross nor Terry were 
engaged in on-air commentary about their respective campaigns.  Since 
the hosts were not directly promoting their respective campaigns, they 
were arguably not making in-kind contributions to those campaigns.  
Where there are no such contributions, the policy objectives behind cam-
paign finance regulations are not stifled by First Amendment protections.  
Thus, the application of the media exemption in these cases successfully 
balanced the competing First Amendment interest and campaign finance 
purposes.  A narrowing of the media exemption to require disclosure of 
                                                 
 134. FEC, Advisory Opinion 1992-37 (1992), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos 
/searchao. 
 135. Id.  The show, entitled “Randall Terry Live,” was broadcast on approximately ninety-five 
stations nationwide, but on only one station in New York State, where Terry was a candidate.  In his 
letter to the FEC, Terry stated that the signal from the state station reached areas west of the district 
for which he was a candidate, but that “the signal is almost extinct” at the district boundary.  Id.  
Additionally, Terry informed the FEC that he was a contractual employee of Randall Terry Live, 
Inc., and not an owner in any form; a family member was the sole incorporator, and  neither the 
family member nor the corporation had made any donations or in-kind contributions to the cam-
paign.  Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  The Commission also stated that it interpreted the candidate’s representation to in-
clude a commitment to refrain from attacks on his opponents and from soliciting funds or airing ads 
for those purposes.  Id. 
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on-air contributions would seemingly not have applied to the conduct of 
either Ross or Terry. 
V. WASHINGTON STATE’S APPLICATION OF THE MEDIA EXEMPTION 
An analysis of Washington State’s application of the media exemp-
tion to the on-air conduct of radio talk show hosts highlights the trouble-
some aspects of the media exemption’s conflict with the policies of cam-
paign finance regulations.  Such an analysis also suggests the manner in 
which the media exemption might be narrowed to more fully achieve the 
goals of campaign finance regulations while not limiting the speech of 
the press in any substantial manner.  By looking first to Washington 
State law, and then to the PDC’s application of the media exemption to 
radio talk show hosts, and finally to the courts’ application of the exemp-
tion, the complexities of the issue can be clearly understood. 
In Washington State, “political advertising” is not included within 
the media exemption.138  Political advertising includes, in part, “radio or 
television presentations, or other means of mass communication, used for 
the purpose of appealing, directly or indirectly, for votes or for financial 
or other support in any election campaign.”139  The PDC has further de-
fined the term “political advertising” as it relates to the media exemption.  
Washington Administrative Code § 390-05-290 provides: 
Political advertising does not include letters to the editor, news or 
feature articles, editorial comments or replies thereto in a regularly 
published newspaper, periodical, or on a radio or television broad-
cast where payment for the printed space or broadcast time is not 
normally required. 
Therefore, the media exemption would apply to coverage about a ballot 
measure or candidate when it takes place during the content portion of a 
program, when payment is normally not required. 
Additionally, in interpreting Washington law, the PDC “consider[s] 
the approach of the Federal Elections Commission[.]”140  As previously 
noted, federal interpretations of the federal media exemption are helpful 
because the Washington statute expressly incorporated the federal courts’ 
construction of the media exemption.  However, the PDC is not bound by 
the FEC decisions, “given the different history and text of the Washing-
ton State statute.”141 
                                                 
 138. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.020(15)(b)(iv) (2008). 
 139. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.020(38) (2008). 
 140. Edelman v. State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 99 P.3d 386, 393 (2004). 
 141. Id. 
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A.  Is There an In-Kind Contribution When a Radio Station Provides 
Broadcast Time to a Talk Show Host? 
Although the FEC found in In Re Ross that the media exemption 
applied and that the station did not make an in-kind contribution to the 
Dave Ross campaign, it did not address the question of whether such an 
in-kind contribution is made by a talk show host who is a candidate and 
who voices his support for himself as candidate.  In Washington State, 
this question has been addressed by both the PDC and the Washington 
State Supreme Court.  This section examines the approach taken by each. 
While the position adopted by the PDC was overruled by the court 
in No New Gas Tax, the PDC’s analysis and determination that a radio 
station broadcasting a talk show whose host was a candidate for office 
would make an in-kind contribution to the candidate not only highlights 
the need for reform in this area, but it also offers a method to determine 
when such a contribution is made.  For a narrowing of the media exemp-
tion to be effective in more fully realizing the goal of campaign finance 
reform, there must be a method to determine what constitutes a contribu-
tion that should be disclosed.  The PDC has suggested such an ap-
proach.142 
In the context of a radio talk show host who was a candidate for of-
fice, the PDC concluded that a radio station would be making an in-kind 
contribution to the candidate if the candidate used his or her radio show 
to conduct political advertising.143  In an advisory opinion, the PDC spe-
cifically addressed the question of “whether a radio/television talk show 
host who becomes a candidate for state office under the Public Disclo-
sure Law must report the time he is regularly on the air after becoming a 
candidate as an in-kind contribution from his employer.”144  In its opi-
nion, the PDC recognized that the law does exclude a news item, feature, 
commentary, or editorial given as part of a broadcast media program 
from the definition of contribution, assuming that certain standards are 
met.145  The PDC stated, however, that a news item, feature, or commen-
tary must be contrasted with “political advertising,” “which is defined to 
                                                 
 142. PDC, Advisory Op., 45 (Aug. 29,1995), available at http://www.pdc.wa.gov/archive/ 
commissionmeetings/meetingshearings/pdfs/2007/09.27.07.SanJuanCountyDocs.pdf. 
 143. Id. at 44. 
 144. Id. at 43.  The PDC also addressed the issue of whether the on-air time would be a contri-
bution subject to limit pursuant to Initiative 134, which stated, inter alia, that no person may give a 
candidate for statewide office more than $1,000 per election.  Id.  The PDC’s opinion was specifical-
ly addressed with regard to a “station employee who, as a talk show host, expresses his opinion and 
invites listener comments about the policies and performance of public officials, including officials 
who may be his opponents in the campaign, and about state and local issues that may be campaign 
issues.”  Id. at 44. 
 145. Id. 
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include any radio . . . presentation used for the purpose of appealing, di-
rectly or indirectly, for votes or for financial or other support in any elec-
tion campaign.”146  The PDC concluded that “the donation or transfer at 
less than full market value of political advertising, or the resources to 
produce and disseminate political advertising (such as free airtime), 
would be considered a contribution.”147 
In its analysis, the PDC found five factors to be pertinent, and it ad-
vised that “persons relying on the conclusions herein should determine 
whether their circumstances are consistent with these underlying 
facts.”148  First, the PDC found that the radio host was a long-time em-
ployee of the station and clearly not hired in anticipation of his candida-
cy.149  Second, neither the station nor its parent company was owned or 
controlled by the candidate, and no one associated with control of the 
station would be associated with the candidate’s campaign.150  Third, the 
talk show host would be on the air as part of his regularly scheduled pro-
gram, and no changes in the production, nature, format, length, or time 
slot of the show were to take place after he became a candidate or in an-
ticipation of his candidacy.151  Fourth, no changes in the terms and condi-
tions of the host’s employment or compensation were to occur after he 
became a candidate or in anticipation of his candidacy.152  And finally, 
the PDC relied on the fact that no paid political ads supporting the talk 
show host’s candidacy or opposing the candidacy of any of his oppo-
nents would air during his program.153 
Under the PDC’s Advisory Opinion, a talk show host, as a candi-
date, would receive a contribution from the radio station if, while on the 
air, the host 
Solicits votes, expressly advocates or expressly discusses his candi-
dacy, or expressly discusses the candidacy of any of his opponents; 
Solicits or accepts contributions or campaign volunteers; 
Expressly advocates the defeat of opposing candidates.154 
                                                 
 146. Id.  See also WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.020(32) (2008); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-05-
290 (2008) (defining “political advertising”). 
 147. PDC, Advisory Op., 44 (Aug. 29,1995), available at http://www.pdc.wa.gov/archive/ 
commissionmeetings/meetingshearings/pdfs/2007/09.27.07.SanJuanCountyDocs.pdf. 
 148. Id. at 43−45. 
 149. Id. at 44. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 44−45. 
 153. Id. at 45. 
 154. Id. 
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The Commission found that such airtime would be a contribution be-
cause it constituted something of value to the campaign for which the 
candidate did not provide consideration.155  “Furthermore, the use of air-
time by a candidate to promote his candidacy does not fall within the 
exception for news, features, commentaries, and editorials provided in 
the public interest.”156  Such airtime, the Commission continued, would 
be considered “political advertising.”157 
The talk show host referenced in the PDC opinion worked for radio 
station KVI AM, owned by Fisher Communications.158  Fisher stated that 
the Commission’s Opinion requiring such disclosure “strikes a reasona-
ble balance between important public policies” and “provides a relatively 
clear rule that is easily applicable by broadcasters.”159 
While the PDC opinion would provide a relatively clear rule that 
could be applied by broadcasters, such an approach was rejected by the 
Washington State Supreme Court in No New Gas Tax.160  However, if the 
media exemption were narrowed such that talk show hosts who do not 
equally present both sides of campaign issues were required to file a re-
port with the PDC showing the duration and value of the air time pro-
vided, the public would know the equivalent amount of money an oppo-
nent would have to spend to buy air time to promote their views or can-
didacy.  As long as contribution limits do not apply, political speech 
would not be chilled, and free speech interests would be protected. 
B.  San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax 
Whereas the PDC looked at the use of airtime in support of a can-
didate, the issue in No New Gas Tax concerned the use of airtime in sup-
port of a ballot measure.161  The proposal suggested in this Comment 
would be equally applicable regardless of whether the airtime was used 
to support a candidate or a ballot measure because the disclosure of a 
contribution would be based upon unequal promotion of an issue or can-
didate. 
                                                 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id.  The PDC stated that airtime that constituted a contribution in this context must be 
valued in the amount of its fair market value.  Id. at 46.  See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-16-
206(3) (2008). 
 158. Response Brief, supra note 14, at 2. 
 159. Id. 
 160. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831, 840 (Wa. 2007). 
 161. Prior to No New Gas Tax, the PDC had not been asked to adopt a rule or issue an advisory 
opinion about how the media exemption applied to a talk show host who could potentially be a polit-
ical committee supporting or opposing a ballot measure.  Amicus Curiae Brief of the Attorney Gen-
eral, at 13 n.2, San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831 (Wa. 2007) (No. 05-2-01205-3), 
2005 WL 4158306. 
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Subsection 1 briefly examines the events leading to the dispute in 
No New Gas Tax, and specifically, the on-air conduct of two radio talk 
show hosts.  Subsection 2 discusses the initial allegations against the No 
New Gas Tax political committee and also looks at the initial Superior 
Court ruling.  Subsection 3 examines the legal ramifications of the ruling 
and surveys the reaction to the Superior Court decision.  Finally, Subsec-
tion 4 discusses the reasoning and the holding of the Washington State 
Supreme Court in No New Gas Tax. 
1. Background 
In the spring of 2005, the Washington legislature adopted a 9.5-
cent-per-gallon increase in the state gasoline tax to pay for improvements 
in the state’s roads and highway system.162  During that time, Kirby Wil-
bur and John Carlson were radio talk show hosts with regularly sche-
duled programs on 570 KVI AM, a radio station owned by Fisher Com-
munications.163  As a part of their broadcasts, Wilbur and Carlson typi-
cally discussed their view on political and social issues.164  Fisher 
charged for political advertising during the commercial segments of its 
radio programs, but it did not charge for the value of any content time 
associated with either Wilbur’s or Carlson’s talk shows.165 
Wilbur and Carlson strongly criticized the legislature’s enactment 
of the fuel tax166 and worked to support its repeal.  In addition to their 
support of the repeal of the tax, Wilbur and Carlson’s on-air comments 
indicated that they were involved in the formation of an initiative cam-
paign to repeal the tax.167 
On May 6, 2005, No New Gas Tax (NNGT) registered with the 
PDC as a political committee.168  The purpose of the committee was to 
support a ballot measure, Initiative 912, that would have repealed the 
                                                 
 162. Response Brief, supra note 14, at 4. 
 163. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 834. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. In early May 2005, Wilbur told his listeners: “[Carlson] and I have been meeting with a 
number of people . . . . We a group of people have established an organization known as No New 
Gas Tax.  We have a website nonewgastax.com.”  “[Carlson] and I got together based on our expe-
riences and some others, we said okay look we are going to ask the audience to step forward and 
pledge money and time at nonewgastax.com and that’s a website, nonewgastax.com, and we said if 
we got 25,000 dollars of seed money and 1,000 volunteers  [the campaign would be launched].”  
Several days later, Wilbur and Carlson told their listeners that “according to the numbers uh that we 
got over the weekend, over 81,000 dollars was raised in three and a half days.”  Response Brief, 
supra note 14, at 5. 
 168. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 834. 
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statewide fuel tax approved by the Washington legislature.169  The cam-
paign had until July 8, 2005, to gather the required signatures.170 
Once NNGT had registered as a political committee, Wilbur and 
Carlson addressed their role in starting the campaign to repeal the tax 
increase in a newspaper interview.171  They stated: “Our legal team is 
writing the initiative . . . .  We hope to file it this week.”172  Additionally, 
a KVI press release discussed Wilbur and Carlson’s role in forming the 
initiative campaign, stating: “KVI Country Delivers a Resounding ‘No’ 
to New Gas Tax.  KVI’s Wilbur and Carlson raise funds and support for 
‘No New Gas Tax’ effort.”173  During the first several weeks of the cam-
paign, Wilbur and Carlson repeatedly asked their listeners for contribu-
tions.174 
2.  Legal Action 
On June 22, 2005, the prosecuting authorities for San Juan County 
and the cities of Auburn, Kent, and Seattle filed an action against 
NNGT.175  They alleged that NNGT violated the disclosure provisions of 
the FCPA by, in part, failing to report “valuable radio announcer profes-
sional services and valuable commercial radio airtime” as a campaign 
contribution under Washington Revised Code § 42.17.020(15)(a) and 
seeking an injunction to prevent NNGT from accepting in-kind contribu-
tions from Fisher Communications until it complied with the disclosure 
requirements.176  The plaintiffs argued that Wilbur and Carlson were 
spokespersons, officers, and agents for NNGT and that their conduct 
constituted advertising for the campaign.177 
                                                 
 169. Id. 
 170. Response Brief, supra note 14, at 4. 
 171. Id. at 5.  See also Richard Roesler, Anti-gas-tax activists encounter legal hurdles, 
SPOKESMANREVIEW.COM, July 2, 2005, available at http://www.spokesmanreview.com/ 
tools/story_pf.asp?ID=78291. 
 172. Response Brief, supra note 14, at 5. 
 173. Id.  KVI’s general manager acknowledged in an internal memorandum the role Wilbur 
and Carlson played in the campaign, stating that “the press release sent this week gives the appear-
ance that we [KVI] are sponsoring this No New Gas Tax initiative.”  Id. at 5−6. 
 174. Id. at 6.  For example, Carlson told his listeners: “So, if you’re with me, check out this 
website here . . . and sign up make a donation and let’s undue this thing.  We got six weeks to get the 
signatures and make this thing happen.”  Id. 
 175. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831, 834 (Wa. 2007)..  The complaint 
further alleged that NNGT failed to adequately disclose the identities of Internet contributors and 
that it made material misstatements regarding the fuel tax at issue.  Id. at 834 n.2. 
 176. Id. at 834. 
 177. Id.  NNGT asserted fourteen counterclaims against the plaintiffs, alleging that they vi-
olated its civil rights by bringing the enforcement action and obtaining the preliminary injunction.  
Id. at 835–36 n.5.  NNGT sought a declaratory judgment that the prosecutors violated its constitu-
tional rights, injunctive relief prohibiting the prosecutors from continuing to commit the alleged 
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In October 2005, the superior court granted the plaintiffs’ motion 
for a preliminary injunction, “Requiring Compliance with Fair Campaign 
Practices Act.”178  The court ruled that NNGT was required to disclose 
the value of air time supporting the initiative campaign because it consti-
tuted an in-kind contribution of political advertising by Fisher Commu-
nications.179  The trial court issued an oral opinion and entered specific 
findings in support of the preliminary injunction.180  The court found: (1) 
that Wilbur and Carlson were principles in the campaign; (2) that Wilbur 
and Carlson had intentionally promoted the campaign by advertising on 
their radio shows; (3) that the on-air advertising was in addition to and 
different from any editorializing, comment, or discussion by the hosts on 
their shows; (4) that it had value to the campaign similar to advertising 
the campaign could have purchased on air; (5) that the value of the ad-
vertising had not been disclosed to the PDC in the manner of any other 
in-kind contribution; and (6) that requiring reporting of that value would 
not restrict Wilbur or Carlson in their on-air speech in any way.181  The 
preliminary injunction required disclosure of contributions prior to May 
31, 2005.182 
The I-912 campaign substantially complied with the preliminary in-
junction by identifying the source of its unreported monetary contribu-
tions and by disclosing the value of in-kind contributions of broadcast 
time.183  The campaign disclosed a $20,000 contribution from Fisher 
Broadcasting.184  On July 8, 2005, the I-912 campaign delivered the ne-
                                                                                                             
violations, vacation of the preliminary injunction order, and an award of attorneys’ fees.  Id. at 835–
36. 
 178. Response Brief, supra note 14, at 8.  The trial court found that there was “inadequate time 
or opportunity for [the county and city prosecutors] to resolve this matter through the PDC.”  Id. at 
7.  Also, in response to questions from the I-912 campaign attorney, the court stated that it was not 
requiring the campaign to do anything other than comply with existing disclosure laws.  Id. at 8.  
The trial court dismissed NNGT’s counterclaims and denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ 
fees.  Additionally, the trial court granted the prosecutors’ motion for voluntary dismissal of its 
remaining claims.  No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831, 835–36. 
 179. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 837. 
 180. Response Brief, supra note 14, at 8. 
 181. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, No. 05-2-01205-3, 2005 WL 5167975 (Wash. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2005). 
 182. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 835. 
 183. Response Brief, supra note 14, at 10. 
 184. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 835.  The preliminary injunction provided that if the cam-
paign could not provide an exact valuation of the in-kind contribution, it should make a reasonable 
and good-faith effort to make such a valuation.  Response Brief, supra note 14, at 10.  The trial court 
declined to further clarify its order, stating: “you have the same problem that any other candidate or 
campaign has in trying to understand how to make full reporting.”  No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 
835. 
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cessary signatures to the Secretary of State to have the initiative placed 
on the November 8, 2005 ballot, where it was rejected by the voters.185 
Pending its petition for discretionary review,186 NNGT filed a re-
quest for an emergency stay, in which NNGT claimed that it would have 
no way to assess whether or when Washington’s $5,000 limit on contri-
butions within twenty-one days prior to an election would be crossed by 
Wilbur and Carlson’s discussion of the initiative on the air.187  The court 
of appeals denied the stay but expedited the hearing for NNGT’s motion 
for discretionary review.188 
3.  Reaction to the Superior Court Ruling 
To many of those who worried about the possible abuse of cam-
paign finance regulations, the superior court ruling in No New Gas Tax 
served to justify their fears.  Characterizing the radio hosts’ speech as a 
contribution had two important legal consequences under the campaign 
finance provisions of the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA).189  First, 
the initiative campaign was required to assign a dollar value to the 
speech and report it to the PDC.190  Second, the hosts would be precluded 
from making more than $5,000 worth of such contributions to a candi-
date or initiative during the twenty-one days immediately preceding the 
election.191 
                                                 
 185. I-912 was rejected by margin of 54.6% to 45.4%.  See Wash. Secretary of State 2005 
Initiative Measures, available at http://www.vote.wa.gov/Elections/Results/Measures.aspx?e= 
816913c8-43d7-4b77-be19-3d794615271e. 
 186. NNGT first sought discretionary review of the trial court order and requested a stay pend-
ing its resolution.  A court of appeals commissioner denied the request, finding that NNGT was not 
harmed by the lack of stay because the order required NNGT to disclose only the contributions re-
ceived before May 31, 2005, and NNGT had complied with the order.  No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 
835. 
 187. Id. at 835.  Fisher Communications’ general manager stated that he “will have to direct 
Mr. Carlson and Mr. Wilbur to not discuss I-912 during the content portions on their programs to 
avoid [the risk of violating the contribution limit] because Fisher Seattle Radio does not wish to face 
a possible prosecution for violation of the Fair Campaign Practices Act.”  Id.  In its opening brief to 
the Washington State Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued that the lack of any limitation on free 
speech or “chilling” was demonstrated by events during the twenty-one days prior to the general 
election.  The plaintiffs noted that the talk show hosts continued to raise money for the campaign, 
asking listeners to donate in the name of Judge Christopher Wickham, the trial court judge.  Re-
sponse Brief, supra note 14, at 17. 
 188. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 835. 
 189. Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU of Washington at 3, San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 
157 P.3d 831 (Wa. 2007) (No. 77966-0), 2006 WL 1893968.  The FCPA is also known as the Public 
Disclosure Act.  Id. 
 190. Id.; see also WASH.REV.CODE § 42.17.090 (2008). 
 191. Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU of Washington, supra note 189, at 3.  See also 
WASH.REV.CODE § 42.17.105(8) (2008). 
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Reaction to the superior court decision was swift and national in its 
scope.  Noted columnist George Will wrote in Newsweek: “What has 
happened in Seattle prefigures what a national Democratic administration 
might try to do―perhaps also by reviving the ‘fairness doctrine’ (an 
‘equal time’ regulation)―to strangle conservative talk radio.  And what 
has happened here―the use of campaign regulations as a weapon of par-
tisanship―is spreading.”192  A Wall Street Journal editorial cautioned: 
“Consider what’s going on in Washington State as an early warning.”193  
An editorial in the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review declared: “A cold front is 
blowing in from Washington State.  Calling it ‘chilling’ does not do it 
justice.  It should send a shudder down the spine of anyone who still be-
lieves in the First Amendment.”194 
Although political talk radio is largely dominated by conservative 
voices,195 the legal reaction against the trial court’s decision in No New 
Gas Tax came from all sides of the political and ideological spectrums.196  
When the case reached the Washington State Supreme Court, amicus 
briefs were submitted from the American Civil Liberties Union of Wash-
ington, the Cato Institute, the Washington Association of Broadcasters, 
the Building Industry Association of Washington, and the Center for 
Competitive Politics.197 
4.  Supreme Court Ruling 
The Washington State Supreme Court accepted review of the case 
based on the trial court’s CR 12(b)(6) dismissal of NNGT’s counterclaim 
that the plaintiffs had violated several of the NNGT’s constitutional 
rights by obtaining a preliminary injunction order requiring it to disclose 
the value of radio broadcasts.198  Although the propriety of the prelimi-
nary injunction was not directly before the court (as the plaintiffs had 
                                                 
 192. George F. Will, Speechless in Seattle: What has Happened in Seattle Prefigures What a 
National Democratic Administration Might Try to Do to Stifle Conservative Talk Radio, 
NEWSWEEK, at 24, Oct. 9, 2006, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/44879/page/1. 
 193. Brian C. Anderson, Commentary, Shut Up, They Explained, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2006, at 
E4, available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110007867. 
 194. Dimitri Vassilaros, Editorial, Well, Shut My Mouth!, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, Nov. 
28, 2005, at D2, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_398015.html. 
 195. See Michael Harrison, 2009 Talkers 250 Featuring the Heavy Hundred: The 100 Most 
Important Radio Talk Show Hosts in America, TALKERS MAGAZINE, http://talkers.com/on 
line/?p=267 (last visited July 15, 2009).  Talkers Online Magazine annually ranks the top 100 “most 
important” talk radio hosts in America.  The majority of that list is composed of conservative talk 
show hosts.  Id. 
 196. Michael Bindas, Editorial, Preserving the Right to Free Speech, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, May 25, 2006, at E3, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/ 
271432_freespeech25.html. 
 197. Id. 
 198. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831, 833 (Wa. 2007). 
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voluntarily dismissed their complaint against NNGT and NNGT did not 
appeal), the court stated that it was necessary to review the issue in order 
to resolve whether the trial court properly dismissed NNGT’s counter-
claims.199 
In its analysis, the court looked to whether the application of the 
media exemption should have prevented the trial court from issuing the 
preliminary injunction.200  The court first considered whether the trial 
court correctly construed the statutory term “contribution,” noting that 
the definition of contribution included the media exemption.201  The 
court rejected the prosecutors’ argument that Wilbur and Carlson’s 
broadcasts fell outside the media exemption because the broadcasts con-
stituted “political advertising.”202  Instead, the court stated that it would 
follow the approach taken by federal courts in applying the media ex-
emption, looking first to whether the media exemption applies to the 
communication at issue before considering whether the communication 
fits within the otherwise broad definition of contribution.203 
To determine whether the media exemption applied to the commu-
nication at issue, the court looked at whether the news medium was con-
trolled by a candidate or political committee and whether it was function-
ing as a regular news medium with respect to the conduct in question.204  
The court found that the phrase “not controlled by a candidate or political 
committee” modifies “news medium” and does not modify “news item, 
feature, commentary, or editorial.” 205  Therefore, the applicability of the 
media exemption did not turn on Wilbur and Carlson’s relationship to the 
campaign.206  “The question is whether the news medium―here, the ra-
                                                 
 199. Id. at 836–37.  The court stated that because many of NNGT’s counterclaims originated 
from the preliminary injunction order, and the trial court dismissed the counterclaims based on legal 
determinations it made in the preliminary order, it must determine whether the trial court erred in 
entering the injunction.  Id at 836..  The court also noted that the standard of review regarding the 
grant or denial of preliminary injunctions is the abuse of discretion standard.  Id. at 837. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id.. 
 202. Id. at 839. 
 203. Id.  The court stated that this approach accords with the purpose of the media exemption, 
which is to avoid burdening the First Amendment right of the press.  Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id.  In its amicus brief to the court in support of No New Gas Tax, the Washington State 
Association of Broadcasters noted that this distinction was critical because it provides a clear rule 
whereby the entity that provides the financing, i.e., the broadcaster, may also control compliance 
with the exemption.  By way of contrast, if the person who controls the news medium were deemed 
to be the talk show host, then the broadcasting corporation might find itself in the position of having 
unwittingly financed illegal contributions if the host is later determined by a court to have been a 
“principal” of a campaign.  Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington State Association of Broadcasters at 
18−19, San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d 831 (Wa. 2007) (No. 77966-0), 2006 WL 
2303733. 
 206. No New Gas Tax, 157 P.3d at 839. 
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dio station―is controlled by a political committee, not whether a politi-
cal committee authored the content of a particular communication.”207  
The court noted that, as with the federal media exemption, control does 
not change from hour to hour depending on who may be hosting a par-
ticular radio program.208 
Although the PDC had interpreted the applicability of the media 
exemption differently, the court was not bound by such interpretations.209  
The opinion quickly dismissed reliance on the previous PDC declarations 
and opinions that stated that the use of air time to solicit votes or funds or 
to expressly advocate either in favor of one’s own campaign or for the 
defeat of one’s opponent constitutes a reportable contribution.210  The 
court stated that: “We will not defer to a PDC declaratory order that con-
flicts with a statute.”211  In their opinion, however, the justices did not 
examine the rationale employed by the PDC in reaching its conclusions 
regarding the statute; rather, the court merely rejected PDC’s interpreta-
tions as contrary to the statutory media exemption.212 
In ruling on its interpretation of the law, the court gave little con-
sideration to the possible ramifications of its ruling.  At oral argument, 
the prosecutors argued that without the limiting construction imposed by 
the PDC, media corporations could become “king makers,” providing 
their favored candidates and ballot measure advocates with unlimited 
access to the airwaves.213  Instead, the court found that while the term 
“commentary” is not defined, it plainly encompassed advocacy for or 
against an issue, candidate, or campaign, whether or not that involved the 
solicitation of votes, money, or “other support.”214  Such express advoca-
cy, the court continued, is “a core aspect of the media’s traditional 
role.”215 
In ruling that the media exemption applied, the court declared that it 
was not appropriate to draw distinctions between commentary and politi-
cal advertising in this context.216  The court stated that content was large-
ly irrelevant in deciding whether a media entity is exercising its valid 
press function; the media exemption applied regardless of the content of 
the publication or the speaker’s motivations, intent, sources of informa-
                                                 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 840. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id.  The court further declared that there “is no express advocacy or solicitation limitation 
to the media exemption.”  Id. 
 213. Id. at 840 n.10. 
 214. Id. at 840. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id.  
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tion, or connection with a campaign.217  Additionally, the media exemp-
tion could apply regardless of whether exercise of the media function 
was fair, balanced, or expressed advocacy.218 
The court did find, however, that the distinction between “political 
advertising” and “commentary” might be relevant in deciding whether a 
media entity was performing a legitimate press function, but it stated that 
this distinction did not turn on the content of the communication.219  In-
stead, the court reasoned that the distinction turned on whether that 
communication occurred during the period of the broadcast where pay-
ment is normally required.220  The court explained that if the coverage of 
a candidate or ballot measure occurred during the content period of a 
broadcast, as opposed to during the commercial advertising period, the 
media exemption would apply.221  Therefore, the mere fact that a broad-
cast has value to a campaign, or includes solicitation of funds, votes, or 
other support, does not convert commentary into advertising when it oc-
curs during the content portion of a broadcast for which payment is not 
normally required.222 
The court found that this reasoning “appropriately creates a bright-
line rule by distinguishing paid and unpaid broadcast time.”223  Such a 
rule would limit judicial inquiry into the content of the speech and focus 
instead on the content-neutral question of whether the radio station ordi-
narily would collect a fee for the broadcast.224  Because the broadcasts in 
question occurred during the regularly scheduled content portion of Wil-
bur and Carlson’s radio programs, not during the commercial advertising 
time for which Fisher ordinarily collected a fee, the court found that 
Wilbur and Carlson’s broadcasts supporting the initiative campaign did 
fall within the media exemption, “regardless of whether the talk show 
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hosts acted at the behest of NNGT or solicited votes and financial sup-
port for the initiative campaign.”225 
Because the media exemption applied, the court held that the trial 
court erred in ruling that the radio broadcasts were contributions subject 
to disclosure under the FCPA.226  As the broadcasts were not contribu-
tions subject to disclosure, the court held that the trial court improperly 
granted the preliminary injunction because the prosecutors failed to es-
tablish a clear and equitable right to disclosure of the value of the radio 
broadcasts supporting the initiative campaign.”227 
VI. WHERE DOES THE DECISION IN NO NEW GAS TAX LEAVE 
WASHINGTON AND THE MEDIA EXEMPTION? 
Although the ruling of the Washington State Supreme Court in No 
New Gas Tax answered the specific issues regarding the NNGT cam-
paign, it is the position of this Comment that the Court failed to satisfac-
torily resolve the larger questions involved.  Campaign finance regula-
tions seek to shed the bright light of publicity on the abuses and excesses 
of campaign finance through the disclosure of contributions and expendi-
tures.  The in-kind contributions made when the media venture beyond 
the reporting of news and editorial commentary to provide direct political 
advertising or other support to a campaign are of value to that campaign 
and should be disclosed. 
After the November 2005 election, but prior to the Washington 
State Supreme Court ruling in No New Gas Tax, Randall Gaylord, the 
prosecutor for San Juan County in the case, wrote an editorial for The 
Seattle Times in which he said: “Radio talk-show hosts want you to be-
lieve the judge trampled their free-speech rights.  But [the trial judge] 
was just confirming that anyone running an initiative campaign, no mat-
ter how prominent or powerful, must tell the public who is funding their 
campaign.”228 
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Gaylord stated that the sponsors of Initiative 276 decided that when 
the media step outside their traditional news-gathering and editorial roles 
to provide outright political advertising or other support to a campaign, 
the contribution should be disclosed, just like in-kind corporate contribu-
tions of free software, cell phones, or office space.229  The First Amend-
ment, Gaylord continued, 
is not a shield that can be used to conceal campaign contribu-
tions―no matter their source or form. . . .  The citizens who drafted 
our public-disclosure laws understood the importance of openness 
and accountability, and thus required media companies to comply 
when they step into the fray by giving valuable support to a political 
campaign.230 
In the No New Gas Tax decision, the Washington State Supreme 
Court articulated a bright-line rule regarding application of the media 
exemption to what would otherwise be a contribution.  As bright a line as 
the court drew, however, the court was not looking to the question of 
whether the media exemption should be narrowed; it merely interpreted 
the law as it existed. 
As FEC and PDC opinions indicate, there are other considerations 
that might apply to an evaluation of the media exemption as it applies to 
talk radio.  In In re Ross, for example, to answer the question of whether 
the station was acting within its legitimate press function, the FEC 
looked to whether there was any indication that an aspect of the radio 
show was different because of the nature of the host’s candidacy.231  
Likewise, with regard to the Randall Terry program, the FEC concluded 
that the candidate could continue to host his talk show, without receiving 
an in-kind contribution, based on the candidate’s representation that he 
did not intend to use the show to promote his candidacy.232  Similarly, in 
Washington State, the PDC advised that a talk show host who was a can-
didate would receive an in-kind contribution from the radio station if, 
while on the air, the host solicited votes or contributions.233 
The rulings and opinions of the FEC, the PDC, and even the supe-
rior court in No New Gas Tax, further highlight the conflict that exists 
between the application of the media exemption and the policy objectives 
of campaign finance regulations.  Given the court’s holding in No New 
Gas Tax, there is seemingly no barrier to the extent to which a candidate 
with a radio talk show might use his access to public airwaves to solicit 
                                                 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
2009] King Makers? 225 
votes, contributions, or other forms of support.  In theory, a corporation 
that owned a radio station and had a particular political leaning could 
seek to give support to a candidate by providing that candidate with a 
radio show.  So long as the corporation was not controlled by a political 
committee and the function of the host was viewed as a legitimate press 
activity,234 there is presumably no limit to the unregulated self-promotion 
that such a candidate could do on air. 
In a footnote, the No New Gas Tax court stated that nothing in its 
decision foreclosed the state legislature, or the people via the initiative 
process, from limiting the statutory media exemption.235  This Comment 
proposes the form that such a limit should take. 
While the elimination of the media exemption might be possible, it 
is not desirable.  Given state and federal limits on corporate contribu-
tions, and Washington’s imposition of a $5,000 cap on contributions in 
the final three weeks before an election,236 if media commentary were an 
in-kind contribution subject to those limits, broadcasters who chose to air 
content qualifying as a contribution would, at some point, be required by 
law to halt their speech.  In addition to the possibility that some speech 
would actually be stopped, the elimination of the media exemption 
would also likely chill political speech if broadcasters chose to steer clear 
of topics or hosts that could be seen as subjecting them to such contribu-
tion requirements.  Also, it has largely been the established press, such as 
The New York Times, The Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times 
nationally, and The Seattle Times and Seattle Press Club in Washington 
State, that have supported campaign finance reform.237  As one commen-
tator noted, “there is no surer way to turn the press against campaign 
finance reform than to subject the press to new restrictions.”238 
It has been argued that the scope of the media exemption should be 
narrowed by removing endorsements from the exemption’s coverage.239  
Removing endorsements would, one author suggested, satisfy two com-
peting interests: maintaining a free press and preventing corruption or the 
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appearance of corruption.240  While this proposal might prevent some 
corruption, removing endorsements from the scope of the exemption 
would seemingly have much the same chilling effect as doing away with 
the media exemption as a whole.  Bias is inherent in commentary and 
opinion, and there is no bright line between biased opinion and support 
or endorsement.  The removal of endorsements from the protection of the 
media exemption would undoubtedly lead to the removal of some com-
ment as well.241 
In talk radio, such a restriction would have broad application.  Re-
gardless of whether Wilbur and Carlson were principals in the NNGT 
campaign, it is common for talk show hosts to express opinions about 
controversial topics and to support or oppose candidates and initia-
tives.242 
Additionally, if endorsements were subject to contribution or ex-
penditure limits, a question of the value of each in-kind contribution for 
on-air commentary would need to be made.  For example, in a national 
campaign, an endorsement from Rush Limbaugh would be worth more 
than an endorsement from Kirby Wilbur.243  If their support was subject 
to contribution limits, those talk radio hosts who were more popular or 
powerful would actually be most affected by such contribution limits.  
The political speech of Rush Limbaugh, for instance, would be more 
likely to be chilled than the political speech of Kirby Wilbur. 
Just as a narrowing of the media exemption to remove endorse-
ments from its scope would have a chilling effect on protected speech, so 
too would a narrowing of the media exemption to remove the commen-
tary of candidates or principals in a campaign from the exemption.  If the 
existence of contributions turns on whether the host might be considered 
a principal of a campaign, then broadcasters would be forced to start 
monitoring the political behavior of their employees before letting them 
advocate for or against controversial topics.244  If broadcasters did not, 
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they would run the risk of finding out after the fact that otherwise appar-
ently legal broadcasts were actually illegal contributions.245 
The media exemption could, however, be narrowed to more fully 
achieve the policy objectives of campaign finance reform, while still pre-
serving the fundamental First Amendment protections of the press.  The 
narrowing could take the form of a requirement that talk show hosts who 
do not equally present both sides of campaign issues must file a report 
with the PDC or an alternate regulatory agency.246  The report would 
show the duration and value of the air time provided so that the public 
would know the equivalent amount of money an opponent would have to 
spend to buy air time to promote their views or candidacy.247 
Although the question of the valuation of on-air time would need to 
be resolved, such valuation could easily be made based on advertising 
rates for the particular host’s program and the time the host spent com-
menting on a particular issue.  Using this method of valuation, the calcu-
lation would be relatively easy to make.  If the reported duration and val-
ue were not considered part of the contribution limits, the approach 
would not conflict with current campaign regulations and would not 
dampen constitutional rights. 
Under this proposal for narrowing the media exemption, a corpora-
tion that owned a radio station and had a particular political leaning 
could still seek to give support to a candidate by providing that candidate 
with a radio show.  That support, however, would be disclosed to the 
public and have a dollar value for that contribution.  Thus, while the pub-
lic would know who was contributing to a campaign, the corporation 
would not be limited in its support, nor would the talk show host be li-
mited in his commentary. 
As a whole, this approach preserves the policies of campaign 
finance reform without the result of chilling or otherwise limiting social-
ly useful and constitutionally protected campaign speech.  “The electo-
rate . . . ha[s] the right to know of the sources and magnitude of financial 
and persuasional influences upon government.”248  By narrowing the me-
dia exemption as suggested in this Comment, the information base upon 
which the electorate may make its decisions is enlarged without weaken-
ing our First Amendment protections. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
One can imagine many circumstances in which the conduct of a ra-
dio talk show host should, in some form, be disclosed as a contribution to 
or expenditure of a political campaign.  Given current federal and state 
limits on expenditure and contributions at various points within a cam-
paign, including the conduct of talk show hosts as a contribution or ex-
penditure would certainly have the effect of limiting that speech.  With-
out question, public disclosure of campaign contributions is a worthy 
goal, but if achieving such a goal comes at the expense of political 
speech, such a goal would be both difficult to achieve and undesirable.  
If not subject to those limits, however, such disclosure would be desira-
ble. 
The FEC, PDC, and Washington State courts have taken alternate, 
and sometimes conflicting, approaches in their efforts to determine the 
extent of the media exemption as it applies to talk radio.  By attempting 
to shoehorn the particular host’s activity into a form of advertising or 
into a legitimate press function, however, the underlying issues at the 
heart of the tension between the goals of campaign finance regulations 
and First Amendment protections are often neglected. 
Campaign finance regulations have existed since the nineteenth 
century and have had, at their core, the notion that the public should 
know who is contributing to political campaigns.  Campaign finance reg-
ulations are a policy choice—a choice to control the influence of money 
in the political process at the expense of a degree of constitutional pro-
tection on speech and the press.  Likewise, the media exemption is a pol-
icy choice—a choice to accord full protection to the First Amendment 
rights of the press at the expense of countervailing social interests that 
may be served by campaign finance regulations.  If the goals of cam-
paign finance reform are served by requiring disclosure of corporate con-
tributions, they will be better served by requiring the disclosure of in-
kind contributions from radio talk show hosts who do not equally present 
both sides of an issue. 
It is possible to more fully achieve campaign-finance policy objec-
tives without further sacrificing those protections we hold dear.  By nar-
rowing the media exemption such that disclosure of on-air contributions 
would be required as part of campaign finance regulations, while contin-
uing to exempt the media from strict campaign contribution and expendi-
ture limits, it would be possible to better balance the competing interests 
of campaign finance regulations and the protection of the press.  Such a 
plan would not chill political speech.  Instead, the knowledge of who was 
contributing to political campaigns would be increased and the policy 
objectives of campaign finance reform would be more fully achieved. 
